Revealed group preferences on non-convex choice problems

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 1999
Volume: 13
Issue: 3
Pages: 671-687

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper studies the conditions under which the basic results of the revealed preference theory can be established on the domain of choice problems which include non-convex feasible sets; the exercise is closely related to the works of Peters and Wakker (1991) and Bossert (1994). We show that while no continuous choice function can satisfy strong Pareto optimality over the class of all compact and comprehensive choice problems, strong Pareto optimality, Arrow's choice axiom, upper hemicontinuity and a weak compromisation postulate turn out to be necessary and sufficient to represent choice correspondences by continuous, strictly increasing and quasiconcave real-valued functions. Some applications of our main findings to axiomatic bargaining theory are also studied.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:13:y:1999:i:3:p:671-687
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26