Cabotage sabotage? The curious case of the Jones Act

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of International Economics
Year: 2020
Volume: 127
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper examines the economic implications of the Jones Act, which restricts domestic waterborne shipments to American vessels. Since the passage of this cabotage law a century ago, a plausibly exogenous rise in foreign competition has contributed to the closure of most American shipyards and to a decline in American-built ships. Thus, the Jones Act requirements have become more onerous over time. The results show that domestic shipments are less likely to be transported via water than imports of the same good into the same state. Exploiting the decline in Jones-Act-eligible vessels over time, additional results show that this cabotage law has disproportionately decreased domestic water trade especially in coastal states. These findings support common, but to date unverified, claims that the Jones Act impedes domestic trade.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:inecon:v:127:y:2020:i:c:s0022199620300933
Journal Field
International
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26