Market Discipline through Credit Ratings and Too‐Big‐to‐Fail in Banking

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking
Year: 2021
Volume: 53
Issue: 2-3
Pages: 367-400

Authors (3)

SASCHA KOLARIC (not in RePEc) FLORIAN KIESEL (not in RePEc) STEVEN ONGENA (Universität Zürich)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Do credit ratings help enforce market discipline on banks? Analyzing a uniquely comprehensive data set consisting of 1,081 rating change announcements for 154 international financial institutions between January 2004 and December 2015, we find that rating downgrades for internal reasons, such as adverse changes in the operating performance or capital structure of banks, are associated with a significant credit default swap spread widening. However, this widening only occurs for banks that are not perceived as to be Too‐Big‐to‐Fail (TBTF). Our findings question the reliability of credit ratings as a tool to discipline TBTF banks and suggest that regulatory monitoring should remain the main mechanism for disciplining these banks.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:jmoncb:v:53:y:2021:i:2-3:p:367-400
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-26