Competition and Bank Payout Policy

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking
Year: 2024
Volume: 56
Issue: 7
Pages: 1737-1778

Authors (4)

AMEDEO DE CESARI (not in RePEc) DUDLEY GILDER (not in RePEc) WINIFRED HUANG (not in RePEc) ENRICO ONALI (University of Exeter)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Leveraging branch‐level data on bank deposits, we provide evidence of a negative impact of branching restrictions on payout ratios, which occurs only for banks with a low charter value, as proxied by the market‐to‐book ratio. The results for the market‐to‐book ratio extend to the Lerner index, the return on assets, and the Z‐score, suggesting that risk‐shifting incentives drive our results rather than signaling incentives or agency costs. Our results are robust to different proxies for banking competition and identification strategies, and bootstrap simulations suggest that our results are not due to confounding factors.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:jmoncb:v:56:y:2024:i:7:p:1737-1778
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-26