Banks as Secret Keepers

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2017
Volume: 107
Issue: 4
Pages: 1005-29

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Banks produce short-term debt for transactions and storing value. The value of this debt must not vary over time so agents can easily trade it at par like money. To produce money-like safe liquidity, banks keep detailed information about their loans secret, reducing liquidity if needed to prevent agents from producing costly private information about the banks' loans. Capital markets involve information revelation, so they produce risky liquidity. The trade-off between less safe liquidity and more risky liquidity determines which firms choose to fund projects through banks and which ones through capital markets.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:4:p:1005-29
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-26