Bundling Health Insurance and Microfinance in India: There Cannot Be Adverse Selection If There Is No Demand

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2014
Volume: 104
Issue: 5
Pages: 291-97

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Microfinance institutions have started to bundle their basic loans with other financial services, such as health insurance. Using a randomized control trial in Karnataka, India, we evaluate the impact on loan renewal from mandating the purchase of actuarially-fair health insurance covering hospitalization and maternity expenses. Bundling loans with insurance led to a 16 percentage points (23 percent) increase in drop-out from microfinance, as many clients preferred to give up microfinance than pay higher interest rates and receive insurance. In a Pyrrhic victory, the total absence of demand for health insurance led to there being no adverse selection in insurance enrollment.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:5:p:291-97
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24