Status quo bias, multiple priors and uncertainty aversion

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2010
Volume: 69
Issue: 2
Pages: 411-424

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Motivated by the extensive evidence about the relevance of status quo bias both in experiments and in real markets, we study this phenomenon from a decision-theoretic prospective, focusing on the case of preferences under uncertainty. We develop an axiomatic framework that takes as a primitive the preferences of an agent for each possible status quo option, and provide a characterization according to which the agent considers a full-dimensional set of possible priors and abandons her status quo option only if she finds an alternative that returns a higher expected utility for each of these priors. We then show that, in this framework, the very presence of a status quo induces the agent to be more uncertainty averse than she would be without a status quo option.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:2:p:411-424
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26