E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
Year: 2020
Volume: 12
Issue: 4
Pages: 39-72

Authors (5)

Abhijit Banerjee (Massachusetts Institute of Tec...) Esther Duflo (not in RePEc) Clément Imbert (Sciences Po) Santhosh Mathew (not in RePEc) Rohini Pande (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.804 = (α=2.01 / 5 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Can e-governance reforms improve government policy? By making information available on a real-time basis, information technologies may reduce the theft of public funds. We analyze a large field experiment and the nationwide scale-up of a reform to India's workfare program. Advance payments were replaced by "just-in-time" payments, triggered by e-invoicing, making it easier to detect misreporting. Leakages went down: program expenditures dropped by 24 percent, while employment slightly increased; there were fewer fake households in the official database; and program officials' personal wealth fell by 10 percent. However, payment delays increased. The nationwide scale-up resulted in a persistent 19 percent reduction in program expenditure.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejapp:v:12:y:2020:i:4:p:39-72
Journal Field
General
Author Count
5
Added to Database
2026-01-24