Trade Wars and Trade Talks with Data

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2014
Volume: 104
Issue: 12
Pages: 4104-46

Score contribution per author:

8.073 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

How large are optimal tariffs? What tariffs would prevail in a worldwide trade war? How costly would a breakdown of international trade policy cooperation be? And what is the scope for future multilateral trade negotiations? I address these and other questions using a unified framework which nests traditional, new trade, and political economy motives for protection. I find that optimal tariffs average 62 percent, world trade war tariffs average 63 percent, the government welfare losses from a breakdown of international trade policy cooperation average 2.9 percent, and the possible government welfare gains from future multilateral trade negotiations average 0.5 percent. (JEL F12, F13, O19)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:12:p:4104-46
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26