Implicit Contracts in the Japanese Bank Loan Market

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Year: 1985
Volume: 20
Issue: 2
Pages: 211-229

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The implicit contract theory explored by Azariadis [2] suggests that wage rigidity and underemployment are explained by the microeconomic optimizing behavior of each agent in the labor market. In this theory, the former phenomenon is interpreted as risk-sharing arrangements between firms and workers, whereas the latter may occur when workers have the opportunity to use leisure or unemployment insurance benefits.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jfinqa:v:20:y:1985:i:02:p:211-229_01
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26