Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2023
Volume: 131
Issue: 12
Pages: 3352 - 3376

Authors (2)

Michael Ostrovsky (Stanford University) Michael Schwarz (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We present the results of a large field experiment on setting reserve prices in auctions for online advertisements, guided by the theory of optimal auction design suitably adapted to the sponsored search setting. Consistent with the theory, revenues increased substantially after the new reserve prices were introduced.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/725702
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26