Political instability and growth in dictatorships

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2005
Volume: 125
Issue: 3
Pages: 445-470

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We model growth in dictatorships facing each period an endogenous probability of “political catastrophe'' that would extinguish the regime's wealth extraction ability. Domestic capital exhibits a bifurcation point determining economic growth or shrinkage. With low initial domestic capital the dictator plunders the country's resources and the economy shrinks. With high initial domestic capital the economy eventually grows faster than is socially optimal. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:125:y:2005:i:3:p:445-470
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-26