RENT‐SEEKING AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

C-Tier
Journal: Economic Inquiry
Year: 2012
Volume: 50
Issue: 2
Pages: 399-417

Authors (2)

PAULO BARELLI (University of Rochester) SAMUEL DE ABREU PESSÔA (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A general model incorporating rent‐seeking activities in the standard neoclassical model of capital accumulation is presented. The welfare of the representative agent is negatively affected by the efficiency of rent‐seeking activities. Although intuitive, this result is not obvious because long‐run income can be positively affected by more efficient rent‐seeking activities. The model is used to provide explanations for some recent experiences in developing countries, including the relative poor performance of economies that experience a move to a more decentralized system and the observed path of total factor productivity (TFP) in countries like Ireland and Venezuela. (JEL D23, D74, O40, O41, O47)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:ecinqu:v:50:y:2012:i:2:p:399-417
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24