Should central bankers discount the future? A note

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 114
Issue: 1
Pages: 20-22

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Optimal monetary policy under discretion is analysed in a New Keynesian model with rule of thumb pricing. The paper finds that social welfare increases if the policy maker does not discount the future. The welfare improvement rises with the extent of intrinsic inflation persistence.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:1:p:20-22
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26