Score contribution per author:
α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count
The political economy of fiscal adjustments is revisited within the framework of Alesina et al. (1998). A panel that spans from 1970 to 2016 for three datasets (European Union, Eurozone and OECD-19) is constructed. Both descriptive statistics and regression analysis is employed. We assess how successful are policies for budget consolidation. Panel logit and heteroskedasticity probit evaluate the probability of government’s survival after having engaged in tight (loose) fiscal policies. Economic variables and political characteristics of the cabinets are taken into account in the specifications. We reveal that the fiscal balance is an insignificant predictor for the changes of the prime minister or the ideology of the cabinet. Inflation and unemployment rate are significant and positively related to changes in government while spending adjustment composition dummies are negative and significant predictors for such changes. Revenue based adjustments have no effect on re-election prospects. Our results are robust to sensitivity checks, including various sub-sample analysis and non-linear specifications.