Professionals Play Minimax

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 2003
Volume: 70
Issue: 2
Pages: 395-415

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The implications of the Minimax theorem are tested using natural data. The tests use a unique data set from penalty kicks in professional soccer games. In this natural setting experts play a one-shot two-person zero-sum game. The results of the tests are remarkably consistent with equilibrium play in every respect: (i) winning probabilities are statistically identical across strategies for players; (ii) players' choices are serially independent. The tests have substantial power to distinguish equilibrium play from disequilibrium alternatives. These results represent the first time that both implications of von Neumann's Minimax theorem are supported under natural conditions. Copyright 2003, Wiley-Blackwell.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:70:y:2003:i:2:p:395-415
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-28