What is the objective of professional licensing? Evidence from the US market for lawyers

B-Tier
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Year: 2011
Volume: 29
Issue: 4
Pages: 473-483

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

According to public interest theory, professional licensing solves the lemon problem generated by asymmetric information. In contrast, the capture theory claims that licensing aims at increasing professional salaries by restricting supply. This paper shows that the two theories can be identified using data from one regulated profession and provides an empirical application to the US market for entry level lawyers. The empirical results support capture theory.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:4:p:473-483
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-28