Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Finance
Year: 2005
Volume: 60
Issue: 2
Pages: 841-868

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

If management has high private benefits and a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies against takeover threats. Two forces are at play. First, managers can transform employees into a “shark repellent” through long‐term labor contracts and thereby reduce the firm's attractiveness to raiders. Second, employees can act as “white squires” for the incumbent managers. To protect their high wages, they resist hostile takeovers by refusing to sell their shares to the raider or by lobbying against the takeover. The model predicts that wages are inversely correlated with the managerial equity stake, and decline after takeovers.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jfinan:v:60:y:2005:i:2:p:841-868
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-28