A Rational-Voter Explanation of the Cost of Ruling.

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 1995
Volume: 83
Issue: 1-2
Pages: 159-72

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

It is well known that the average government loses votes--the so-called cost of ruling. The authors show that the loss can be explained as a perfectly rational demand for change in a median voter model once the model is amended to let the two parties be visibly different. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:83:y:1995:i:1-2:p:159-72
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-28