School choice with preference rank classes

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2023
Volume: 137
Issue: C
Pages: 317-341

Authors (2)

Ayoade, Nickesha (not in RePEc) Pápai, Szilvia (Concordia University)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We introduce and study a large family of rules for many-to-one matching problems, the Preference Rank Partitioned (PRP) rules. PRP rules are student-proposing Deferred Acceptance rules, where the schools select among applicants in each round taking into account both the students' preferences and the schools' priorities. In a PRP rule each school first seeks to select students based on priority rank classes, and subsequently based on preference rank classes. PRP rules include many well-known matching rules, such as the classic Deferred Acceptance rule, the Boston rule, the Chinese Application-Rejection rules of Chen and Kesten (2017), and the French Priority rules of Bonkoungou (2020), in addition to matching rules that have not been studied yet. We analyze the stability, efficiency and incentive properties of PRP rules in this unified framework.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:137:y:2023:i:c:p:317-341
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-28