Corporate Taxation under Weak Enforcement

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Year: 2021
Volume: 13
Issue: 4
Pages: 36-71

Authors (2)

Pierre Bachas (World Bank Group) Mauricio Soto (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

How should developing countries tax corporate income? We study this question in Costa Rica, where firms face higher average tax rates on profits when revenues marginally increase. We combine discontinuity and bunching designs to estimate the elasticity of taxable profit and separate it into revenue and cost elasticities. We find that firms faced with a higher tax rate slightly reduce revenues but considerably increase costs, thus producing a large elasticity of taxable profit of 3–5. In this context, the revenue-maximizing rate for a corporate tax on profit is below 25 percent, and we show that a tax policy that broadens the base while lowering the rate can almost double the tax revenue collected from these firms.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejpol:v:13:y:2021:i:4:p:36-71
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24