Cartel reporting under passive common ownership

C-Tier

Journal: Economics Letters

Year: 2022

Volume: 216

Issue: C

Authors (2)

Charistos, Konstantinos (not in RePEc) Papadopoulos, Konstantinos G. (Aristotle University of Thessa...)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

View Full Article View on IDEAS/RePEc

Abstract

We consider the effect of passive common ownership on the efficacy of leniency programs to disrupt and deter cartels. Besides reducing deterrence, passive common ownership restrains the incentives of firms to come forward and denounce the cartel and therefore further favors collusion.

Cartel reporting under passive common ownership

Authors (2)

Abstract

Technical Details