Network Centrality and Managerial Market-Timing Ability

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Year: 2022
Volume: 57
Issue: 2
Pages: 704-760

Authors (4)

Evgeniou, Theodoros (not in RePEc) Peress, Joel (INSEAD) Vermaelen, Theo (not in RePEc) Yue, Ling (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We document that long-run excess returns following announcements of share buyback authorizations and insider purchases are a U-shaped function of firm centrality in the input–output trade-flow network. These results conform to a model of investors endowed with a large but finite capacity for analyzing firms. Additional links weaken insiders’ informational advantage in peripheral firms (simple firms whose cash flows depend on few economic links), provided investors’ capacity is large enough, but eventually amplify that advantage in central firms (firms with many links) as a result of investors’ limited capacity. These findings shed light on the sources of managerial market-timing ability.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jfinqa:v:57:y:2022:i:2:p:704-760_10
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-28