Competing Premarital Investments

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2002
Volume: 110
Issue: 3
Pages: 592-608

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper studies premarital parental investments in children's wealth, where spousal wealth is a public good in marriage. By investing in their children's wealth, parents increase the wealth of their children and the quality of the spouses that their children can marry. In large marriage markets, the hedonic return to investment internalizes all the external benefits of premarital investment in wealth so that the competitive equilibrium is efficient. Marriage market competition also increases investments in small marriage markets relative to no competition, but equilibrium investments are not efficient.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:v:110:y:2002:i:3:p:592-608
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-28