Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2003
Volume: 23
Issue: 1
Pages: 183-194

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This note considers two properties of common agency models - pure strategy equilibria with simple competition are robust and equilibria in mechanisms can be reproduced as equilibria with simple competition provided an appropriate no-externalities assumption holds. This note provides counter examples to both these theorems when there are multiple agents. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:23:y:2003:i:1:p:183-194
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-28