How delegation improves commitment

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2010
Volume: 106
Issue: 2
Pages: 137-139

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

McCallum (1995, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 85 (2), 207-211) conjectures that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it. This holds if optimal ex-ante policies do not change if additional information becomes available. However, with a flexibility-credibility trade-off delegation improves credibility.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:106:y:2010:i:2:p:137-139
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-28