Separation of Powers and Political Accountability

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 1997
Volume: 112
Issue: 4
Pages: 1163-1202

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials, but they are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power, but only with appropriate checks and balances. Checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature, yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy. In this way, the two bodies discipline each other to the voters' advantage. Under appropriate checks and balances, separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:112:y:1997:i:4:p:1163-1202.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29