Are Politically Connected Firms More Likely to Evade Taxes? Evidence from Tunisia

B-Tier
Journal: World Bank Economic Review
Year: 2017
Volume: 30
Issue: Supplement_1
Pages: S166-S175

Authors (3)

Bob Rijkersb (not in RePEc) Hassen Arouri (not in RePEc) Leila Baghdadi (World Bank Group)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Are politically connected firms more likely to evade taxes? Using tax, social security, and customs records from Tunisia in which firms owned by former president Ben Ali and his family are identified, this paper demonstrates that connected firms were more likely to evade taxes. Ceteris paribus, connected firms are 4.6% more likely not to submit a tax declaration in spite of registering workers and/or customs transactions and 8.4% more likely to report anomalously low sales when submitting a tax declaration.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:wbecrv:v:30:y:2017:i:supplement_1:p:s166-s175.
Journal Field
Development
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24