Costly information acquisition and the temporal resolution of uncertainty

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2015
Volume: 60
Issue: C
Pages: 115-122

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper studies the choice of an individual who acquires information before choosing an action from a set of actions, whose consequences depend on the realization of a state of nature. Information processing can be costly, for example, due to limited attention. We show that the preference of the individual is completely characterized by a preference for early resolution of uncertainty, which becomes indifference when facing degenerate choices. When information acquisition is no longer part of the decision process, the individual is indifferent to the timing of resolution of uncertainty and she behaves according to the subjective learning model of Dillenberger et al. (2014).

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:60:y:2015:i:c:p:115-122
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29