Progressive tax reform and majority voting

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 1975
Volume: 21
Issue: 1
Pages: 69-78

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In this paper, we have tried to explain why voters can turn down a measure which is supposed to increase the disposable income of a large majority of families. The reasons we advanced were the following: 14 See Downs (1957). 15 See Frey (1971) and various comments on his paper in the subsequent series ofPublic Choice. 16 An example of this is the misleading advertisement used in the Massachusetts campaign against the tax reform: “Don't be fooled—The Graduated Income Tax is just another tax increase—it means more for them, and less for you ... Again!”. -- the increase in disposable income is small for the large middle-income group; -- some people are reluctant to back a measure aimed at helping low-income groups further; -- some do not want to burden too much the high income group of which they hope, eventually to be a part; -- finally, many voters are subject to an intensive campaign of advertisement which focuses their attention on irrelevant issues. One implication of this line of explanation is that public financing of political campaigns, more realistic expectations of upward mobility and more altruism among individuals would probably increase the chances of progressive tax reform. Obviously these three points would merit further research. Copyright Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1975

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:21:y:1975:i:1:p:69-78
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29