Voting and the economic cycle

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2015
Volume: 162
Issue: 1
Pages: 119-133

Authors (2)

John Maloney (not in RePEc) Andrew Pickering (University of York)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Sophisticated voters assess incumbent competence by filtering out economic cycles (which they do not like) from trend growth (which they do). Naive voters on the other hand respond only to raw economic growth. This implies that voting in the aggregate should respond asymmetrically to the economic cycle. Upswings are rewarded by the naive, but punished by the sophisticated. Downswings are punished by all voters. Using an established dataset of over 400 general elections we find that the incumbent vote share (a) responds differently to trend growth than to the cycle, (b) does not respond significantly to positive variation in the economic cycle, and (c) responds significantly and negatively to negative realizations in the economic cycle. In contrast to standard formulations of the ‘grievance asymmetry’ this asymmetric vote response is found to be independent of trend growth. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:162:y:2015:i:1:p:119-133
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29