Household Search and the Marital Wage Premium

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
Year: 2021
Volume: 13
Issue: 4
Pages: 55-109

Authors (2)

Laura Pilossoph (Duke University) Shu Lin Wee (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We develop a model where selection into marriage and household search generate a marital wage premium. Beyond selection, married individuals earn higher wages for two reasons. First, income pooling within a joint household raises risk-averse individuals' reservation wages. Second, married individuals climb the job ladder faster, as they internalize that higher wages increase their partner's selectivity over offers. Specialization according to comparative advantage in search generates a premium that increases in spousal education, as in the data. Quantitatively, household search explains 10–33 percent and 20–58 percent of the premium for males and females, respectively, and accounts for its increase with spousal education.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmac:v:13:y:2021:i:4:p:55-109
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29