The curse of the first-in–first-out queue discipline

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2017
Volume: 104
Issue: C
Pages: 165-176

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We consider a game in which a large number of identical agents choose when to queue up at a single server after it opens. Agents are impatient for service and also incur a cost proportional to time spent in the queue. We show that the first-in–first-out queue discipline and the last-in–first-out queue discipline both lead to a unique equilibrium arrival distribution. However, among all work-conserving queue disciplines, the first-in–first-out performs the worst in terms of equilibrium utility and welfare, while the last-in–first-out performs the best.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:165-176
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29