Understanding Price Controls and Nonprice Competition with Matching Theory

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2012
Volume: 102
Issue: 3
Pages: 371-75

Authors (3)

John William Hatfield (not in RePEc) Charles R. Plott (California Institute of Techno...) Tomomi Tanaka (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We develop a quality competition model to understand how price controls affect market outcomes in buyer-seller markets with discrete goods of varying quality. While competitive equilibria do not necessarily exist in such markets when price controls are imposed, we show that stable outcomes do exist and characterize the set of stable outcomes in the presence of price restrictions. In particular, we show that price controls induce non-price competition: price floors induce the trade of inefficiently high quality goods, while price ceilings induce the trade of inefficiently low quality goods.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:3:p:371-75
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29