Price controls, non-price quality competition, and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2016
Volume: 99
Issue: C
Pages: 134-163

Authors (3)

Hatfield, John William (not in RePEc) Plott, Charles R. (California Institute of Techno...) Tanaka, Tomomi (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We investigate how price ceilings and floors affect outcomes in continuous time, double auction markets with discrete goods and multiple qualities. When price controls exist, the existence of competitive equilibria is no longer guaranteed; hence, we investigate the nature of non-price competition and how markets might evolve in its presence. We develop a quality competition model based on matching theory. Equilibria of the quality competition model always exist in such price-constrained markets; moreover, they naturally correspond to competitive equilibria when competitive equilibria exist. Additionally, we characterize the set of equilibria of the quality competition model in the presence of price restrictions. In a series of experiments, we find that market outcomes closely conform to the predictions of the model. In particular, price controls induce non-price competition between agents both in theory and in the experimental environment; market behaviors result in allocations close to the predictions of the model.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:99:y:2016:i:c:p:134-163
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29