The evolutionary stability of constant consistent conjectures

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2009
Volume: 72
Issue: 1
Pages: 21-29

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In the general context of smooth two-player games, this paper shows that there is a close connection between (constant) consistent conjectures in a given game and the evolutionary stability of these conjectures. Evolutionarily stable conjectures are consistent and consistent conjectures are the only interior candidates to be evolutionarily stable. Examples are provided to illustrate the result.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:72:y:2009:i:1:p:21-29
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29