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α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count
Abstract According to Epictetus, mental freedom and happiness can be achieved by distinguishing between, on the one hand, things that are upon our control (our judgements, desires and acts), and, on the other hand, things that are not upon our control (our body, property and reputation), and by wishing for nothing that is outside our control. We propose two economic accounts of Epictetus’s precept, which extend the symmetric factor of the preference relation beyond its boundaries under non-ethical preferences. The I1 account requires indifference between outcomes differing only on circumstances. The I2 account requires indifference between outcomes that are the best under each circumstance. We explore implications of these precepts for the structure of Epictetusian rationality. When revisiting consumer theory, we show that income/wealth has a purely instrumental value (I1 account) or no value (I2 account). Adaptive desires are ruled out by the I1 account. In game-theoretical contexts, the two accounts of Epictetus’s precept exclude the existence of prisoner’s dilemmas.