Receiving credit: On delegation and responsibility

B-Tier
Journal: European Economic Review
Year: 2023
Volume: 158
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Evidence has shown that blame for a “bad” decision can be shifted by delegating the decision to someone else. We conduct experiments using a four-player delegated dictator game to examine whether the reverse is also true: does one receive credit for taking a “good” decision as compared to delegating the decision to someone else? Our results indicate that the answer is affirmative. A person receives higher rewards when she makes a fair decision herself than when a delegate does. This indicates that responsibility attribution is a double-edged sword that applies to both bad and good outcomes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:eecrev:v:158:y:2023:i:c:s0014292123001514
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29