Bertrand colludes more than Cournot

A-Tier
Journal: Experimental Economics
Year: 2007
Volume: 10
Issue: 1
Pages: 71-77

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

On the basis of evidence of past oligopoly experiments, we argue that there is often significantly more tacit collusion in Bertrand price-choice than in Cournot quantity-choice markets. Copyright Economic Science Association 2007

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:expeco:v:10:y:2007:i:1:p:71-77
Journal Field
Experimental
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29