Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 2002
Volume: 69
Issue: 4
Pages: 973-997

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We examine the force of three types of behavioural dynamics in quantity-setting triopoly experiments: (1) mimicking the successful firm, (2) rules based on following the exemplary firm, and (3) rules based on belief learning. Theoretically, these three types of rules lead to the competitive, the collusive, and the Cournot—Nash outcome, respectively. In the experiment we employ three information treatments, each of which is hypothesized to be conducive to the force of one of the three dynamic rules. To a large extent, the results are consistent with the hypothesized relationships between treatments, behavioural rules, and outcomes. Copyright 2002, Wiley-Blackwell.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:69:y:2002:i:4:p:973-997
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29