Robust Voting.

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 1999
Volume: 99
Issue: 3-4
Pages: 299-310

Authors (2)

Bassett, Gilbert W, Jr (not in RePEc) Persky, Joseph (University of Illinois at Chic...)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The formal equivalence between social choice and statistical estimation means that criteria used to evaluate estimators can be interpreted as features of voting rules. The robustness of an estimator means, in the context of social choice, insensitivity to departures from majority opinion. In this paper, the authors consider the implications of substituting the median, a robust, high breakdown estimator, for Borda's mean. The robustness of the median makes the ranking method insensitive to outliers and reflect majority opinion. Among all methods that satisfy a majority condition, median ranks is the unique one that is monotonic. It is an attractive voting method when the goal is the collective assessment of the merits of alternatives. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:99:y:1999:i:3-4:p:299-310
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24