The design, testing and implementation of Virginia's NOx allowance auction

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2009
Volume: 69
Issue: 2
Pages: 190-200

Authors (5)

Porter, David (Chapman University) Rassenti, Stephen (Chapman University) Shobe, William (University of Virginia) Smith, Vernon (Chapman University) Winn, Abel (Chapman University)

Score contribution per author:

0.402 = (α=2.01 / 5 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We report on the design and testing of three auction mechanisms to maximize revenue and efficiency in the sale of two vintages of nitrous oxide emission allowances by the Commonwealth of Virginia in 2004. The three mechanisms considered were a combinatorial sealed bid (CSB) auction, a sequential English clock (SEC) auction, and a combinatorial English clock (CEC) auction. We find the SEC and CEC mechanisms to be superior the CSB when demand is relatively elastic.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:69:y:2009:i:2:p:190-200
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
5
Added to Database
2026-01-29