Stochastic costly state verification and dynamic contracts

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Year: 2016
Volume: 64
Issue: C
Pages: 1-22

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

I consider a dynamic costly state verification environment in which a risk-averse agent enters into a contract with a risk-neutral principal. The agent has random income which is unknown to the principal but can be verified at a cost. The principal can commit to executing random verifications.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:dyncon:v:64:y:2016:i:c:p:1-22
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29