Focal points and bargaining in housing markets

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2015
Volume: 93
Issue: C
Pages: 89-107

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Are focal points important for determining the outcome of high-stakes negotiations? We investigate this question by examining the role that round numbers play as focal points in negotiations in the housing market. Using a large dataset on home transactions in the U.S., we document sharp spikes in the distribution of final negotiated house prices at round numbers, especially those divisible by $50,000. The patterns cannot be easily explained by simple stories of convenience rounding or by list prices. We conclude that round numbers can serve as focal points, even in settings with very high stakes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:93:y:2015:i:c:p:89-107
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29