Distortion by Audit: Evidence from Public Procurement

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
Year: 2024
Volume: 16
Issue: 4
Pages: 71-108

Authors (3)

Maria Paula Gerardino (not in RePEc) Stephan Litschig (not in RePEc) Dina Pomeranz (Universität Zürich)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Public sector audits are key to state capacity. However, they can create unintended distortions. Regression discontinuity analysis from Chile shows that audits lowered the use of auctions for public procurement, reduced supplier competition, and increased the likelihood of small, local, and incumbent firms winning contracts. Looking inside the black box of the audit process reveals that relative to comparable direct contracts, auctions underwent more than twice as many checks and led to twice as many detected infractions. These findings show that standard audit protocols can mechanically discourage the use of more regulated, complex, and transparent procedures involving more auditable steps.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejapp:v:16:y:2024:i:4:p:71-108
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29