Coordination and focality under gain–loss framing: Experimental evidence

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2018
Volume: 164
Issue: C
Pages: 75-78

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Are people better at coordinating on a focal point when the game is framed as coordinating on a division of losses rather than gains? In an experimental coordination game, we vary the payoff framing (gain vs loss) and stake size (low vs high) to examine this question. We find that loss framing reduces coordination on the focal point, with the strongest effect observed in high stakes games.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:164:y:2018:i:c:p:75-78
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29