THE DEADWEIGHT LOSS OF COUPON REMEDIES FOR PRICE OVERCHARGES*

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Industrial Economics
Year: 2008
Volume: 56
Issue: 2
Pages: 402-417

Authors (2)

A. MITCHELL POLINSKY (Stanford University) DANIEL L. RUBINFELD (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Consumers injured by price overcharges often are awarded coupons that can be used for a limited period of time to purchase the good at a price below that which prevails after the overcharge has been eliminated. Coupon remedies cause a deadweight loss by inducing excessive consumption by consumers with relatively low demand during the remedy period. The magnitude of the loss can be comparable to that caused by the price overcharge. As demand variability goes to zero, the deadweight loss from coupon remedies goes to zero. Eliminating the expiration date for the use of coupons does not eliminate the loss.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jindec:v:56:y:2008:i:2:p:402-417
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29