Majorized correspondences and equilibrium existence in discontinuous games

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2016
Volume: 61
Issue: 3
Pages: 541-552

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract This paper is aimed at widening the scope of applications of majorized correspondences. A new class of majorized correspondences—domain $${\mathcal {U}}$$ U -majorized correspondences—is introduced. For them, a maximal element existence theorem is established. Then, sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in qualitative games are provided. They are used to show the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in compact quasiconcave games that are either correspondence secure or correspondence transfer continuous.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:61:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-015-0874-y
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29