Why Inflation Rose and Fell: Policy-Makers' Beliefs and U. S. Postwar Stabilization Policy

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 2006
Volume: 121
Issue: 3
Pages: 867-901

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper provides an explanation for the run-up of U. S. inflation in the 1960s and 1970s and the sharp disinflation in the early 1980s, which standard macroeconomic models have difficulties in addressing. I present a model in which rational policy-makers learn about the behavior of the economy in real time and set stabilization policy optimally, conditional on their current beliefs. The steady state associated with the self-confirming equilibrium of the model is characterized by low inflation. However, prolonged episodes of high inflation ending with rapid disinflations can occur when policy-makers underestimate both the natural rate of unemployment and the persistence of inflation in the Phillips curve. I estimate the model using likelihood methods. The estimation results show that the model accounts remarkably well for the evolution of policy-makers' beliefs, stabilization policy, and the postwar behavior of inflation and unemployment in the United States.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:121:y:2006:i:3:p:867-901.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29