Selection in the Market for Slaves: New Orleans, 1830–1860

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 1993
Volume: 108
Issue: 2
Pages: 461-473

Authors (2)

Jonathan B. Pritchett (Tulane University) Richard M. Chamberlain (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Greenwald and Glasspiegel argue that adverse selection depressed the market prices of slaves, causing current researchers to overestimate the rate of return from slavery. In this paper we test for the presence of adverse selection by comparing the prices of local slaves with the prices of slaves sold from estate sales. We find no difference in the prices of these slaves, from which we conclude that there was no significant adverse selection in the market. Instead, we propose an alternative explanation for the observed pattern of slave prices based on the costs of shipping slaves to the New Orleans market.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:108:y:1993:i:2:p:461-473.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29